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The current global financial crisis 
grew out of banking losses in the United 
States related to subprime lending. How 
well do economists understand the ori-
gins of such crises and how they spread? 
Was this crisis something new or a replay 
of familiar historical phenomena? Will 
policy interventions be able to mitigate its 
costs? The history of banking crises pro-
vides informative perspectives on these 
and other important questions.
Crises Are Not All the Same
When considering the history of 
banking crises, it is useful to distinguish 
between two phenomena associated with 
banking system distress: exogenous shocks 
that produce insolvency, and pressures on 
banks that arise from rapid withdrawals 
of debt or failures to rollover debt dur-
ing “panics.” These two contributors to 
distress often do not coincide. For exam-
ple, in the rural United States during the 
1920s, large declines in agricultural prices 
cause many banks to fail, often with high 
losses to depositors, but those failures 
were not associated with systemic panics.2 
In 1907, the opposite pattern was visible. 
The United States experienced a systemic 
panic, originating in New York, which was 
precipitated by small aggregate shocks but 
had large short-term systemic effects asso-
ciated with widespread withdrawals of 
deposits. Although some banks failed in 
1907, failures and depositor losses were 
not much higher than in normal times.3 
That crisis was resolved only after banks 
had suspended convertibility and after 
uncertainty about the incidence of the 
shock had been resolved.
The central differences between these 
two episodes relate to the information 
about the shocks producing loan losses. 
In the 1920s, the shocks were loan losses 
in agricultural banks, geographically iso-
lated and fairly transparent. Banks failed 
without subsequent system-wide con-
cerns. During 1907, although the ulti-
mate losses for New York banks were 
small, the incidence of the shock was not 
clear (loan losses reflected complex con-
nections to securities market transactions, 
with uncertain consequences for some 
New York banks). 
Sometimes, large loan losses and con-
fusion regarding their incidence occur 
together. In Chicago in mid-1932, for 
example, large losses resulted in many 
failures and also in widespread withdraw-
als from banks that did not ultimately 
fail. Despite the confusion about the 
incidence of the shock, and the conse-
quent widespread temporary disruptions 
to the financial system, the banks that 
failed were exogenously insolvent; solvent 
Chicago banks experiencing withdrawals 
did not fail. In other episodes, however, 
bank failures may have reflected illiquid-
ity resulting from runs, rather than exog-
enous insolvency.4
Today’s financial turmoil is closer to 
the Chicago experience in 1932 than to 
either the banking shocks of the 1920s or 
those of 1907.5 The shock that prompted 
the turmoil was of moderate size (sub-
prime and Alt-A loans totaled roughly $3 
trillion, including those on the balance 
sheets of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
and total losses are likely to generate total 
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losses of roughly half a trillion dollars), 
and its consequences were significant for 
both solvent and insolvent banks. Unlike 
the Chicago Panic, today’s turmoil prob-
ably has produced the failures of finan-
cial institutions that were arguably sol-
vent prior to their liquidity problems (for 
example, Bear Stearns). 
Banking crises can differ according to 
whether they coincide with other finan-
cial events. Banking crises coinciding with 
currency collapse are called “twin” cri-
ses (as in Argentina in 1890 and 2001, 
Mexico in 1995, and Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea in 1997). A twin crisis can 
reflect two different chains of causation: 
an expected devaluation may encourage 
deposit withdrawal to convert to hard cur-
rency before devaluation (as in the United 
States in early 1933); or, a banking crisis 
can cause devaluation, either through its 
adverse effects on aggregate demand or 
by affecting the supply of money (when a 
costly bank bailout prompts monetization 
of government bailout costs). Sovereign 
debt crises can also contribute to bank 
distress when banks hold large amounts 
of government debt (for example, in the 
banking crises in the United States in 
1861, and in Argentina in 2001).6 
Shifting Perceptions 
of Banking Crises and 
the Desirability of 
Government Protection
The consensus views regarding bank-
ing crises’ origins (fundamental shocks 
versus confusion), the extent to which 
crises result from unwarranted runs on 
solvent banks, the social costs attending 
runs, and the appropriate policies to limit 
the costs of banking crises (government 
safety nets and prudential regulation) 
have changed dramatically, and more 
than once, over the course of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Historical 
experience played a large role in chang-
ing perspectives toward crises, and the 
U.S. experience had a disproportionate 
influence on thinking. Although pan-
ics were observed throughout world his-
tory (as early as Hellenistic Greece, and in 
Rome in 33 A.D.), prior to the 1930s, in 
most of the world, banks were perceived 
as stable; large losses from failed banks 
were uncommon; banking panics were 
not seen as a great risk; and there was lit-
tle perceived need for formal safety nets 
(for example, deposit insurance). In many 
countries, ad hoc policies among banks, 
and sometimes including central banks, 
to coordinate bank responses to liquidity 
crises (as, for example, during the failure 
of Barings investment bank in London 
in 1890), seemed adequate for preventing 
systemic costs from bank instability. 
The unusual experience of the United 
States was a contributor to changes in 
thinking which led to growing concerns 
about banks runs, and the need for aggres-
sive safety-net policies to prevent or mit-
igate runs. In retrospect, the extent to 
which U.S. banking instability informed 
thinking and policy outside the United 
States seems best explained by the size and 
pervasive influence of the United States; 
in fact, the U.S. crises were unique and 
reflected peculiar features of U.S. law and 
banking structure. 
The U.S. Panic of 1907 (the last of 
a series of similar U.S. events, including 
1857, 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1896) 
precipitated the creation of the Federal 
Reserve System in 1913 as a means of 
enhancing systemic liquidity, reducing 
the probability of systemic depositor runs, 
and mitigating the costs of such events.7 
This innovation was specific to the United 
States (other countries either had estab-
lished central banks long before, often 
with other purposes in mind, or had not 
established central banks), and reflected 
the unique U.S. experience with panics — 
a phenomenon that the rest of the world 
had not experienced since 1866, the last 
British banking panic. 
For example, Canada did not suf-
fer panics like those of the United States 
and did not establish a central bank until 
1935. Canada’s early decision to permit 
branch banking throughout the country 
ensured that banks were geographically 
diversified and thus resilient to large sec-
toral shocks (like those to agriculture in 
the 1920s and 1930s), able to compete 
through the establishment of branches 
in rural areas (because of low overhead 
costs of establishing additional branches), 
and able to coordinate the banking sys-
tem’s response in moments of confusion 
to avoid depositor runs (the number of 
banks was small, and assets were highly 
concentrated in several nationwide insti-
tutions). Outside the United States, coor-
dination among banks facilitated systemic 
stability by allowing banks to manage 
incipient panic episodes to prevent wide-
spread bank runs. In Canada, the Bank 
of Montreal occasionally would coordi-
nate actions by the large Canadian banks 
to stop crises before the public was even 
aware of a possible threat.8
The United States, however, was 
unable to mimic this behavior on a 
national or regional scale. U.S. law pro-
hibited nationwide branching, and most 
states prohibited or limited within-
state branching. U.S. banks, in contrast 
to banks elsewhere, were numerous (for 
example, numbering more than 29,000 in 
1920), undiversified, insulated from com-
petition, and unable to coordinate their 
behavior to prevent panics. 
The structure of U.S. banking explains 
why the United States uniquely had bank-
ing panics in which runs occurred despite 
the health of the vast majority of banks. 
The major U.S. banking panics of the 
postbellum era (listed above) all occurred 
at business cycle peaks, and were pre-
ceded by spikes in the liabilities of failed 
businesses and declines in stock prices; 
indeed, whenever a sufficient combina-
tion of stock price decline and rising lia-
bilities of failed businesses occurred, a 
panic always resulted.9 Owing to the U.S. 
banking structure, panics were a predict-
able result of business cycle contractions 
that, in other countries, resulted in an 
orderly process of financial readjustment.
The United States, however, was not 
the only economy to experience occa-
sional waves of bank failures before World 
War I. Nor did it experience the high-
est bank failure rates, or banking system 
losses of that era. None of the U.S. bank-
ing panics of the pre-World War I era saw 
nationwide banking distress (measured 
by the negative net worth of failed banks 
relative to annual GDP) greater than the 
0.1 percent loss of 1893. Losses were gen-
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erally modest elsewhere, but Argentina 
in 1890 and Australia in 1893, the most 
severe cases of banking distress during the 
1875–1913 era, suffered losses of roughly 
10 percent of GDP. Losses in Norway 
in 1900 were roughly 3 percent of GDP 
and in Italy in 1893 roughly 1 percent 
of GDP. With the possible exception of 
Brazil (for which data have yet to be col-
lected to measure losses), there were no 
other cases in 1875–1913 in which bank-
ing loss exceeded 1 percent of GDP. 
Loss rates tended to be low because 
banks structured themselves to limit 
their risk of loss, by maintaining ade-
quate equity-to-assets ratios, sufficiently 
low asset risk, and adequate asset liquid-
ity. Most importantly, market discipline 
(the fear that depositors would withdraw 
their funds) provided incentives for banks 
to behave prudently. The picture of small 
depositors lining up around the block 
to withdraw funds has received much 
attention, but perhaps the more impor-
tant source of market discipline was the 
threat of an informed (often “silent”) run 
by large depositors (often other banks). 
Banks maintained relationships with each 
other through inter-bank deposits and 
the clearing of public deposits, notes, and 
bankers’ bills. Banks often belonged to 
clearinghouses that set regulations and 
monitored members’ behavior. A bank 
that lost the trust of its fellow bankers 
could not long survive.10 
This perception of banks as stable, as 
disciplined by depositors and inter-bank 
arrangements to act prudently, and as 
unlikely to fail, was common prior to the 
1930s. The banking crises of the Great 
Depression changed that perception. U.S. 
bank failures resulted in losses to deposi-
tors in the 1930s in excess of 3 percent 
of GDP. Bank runs, bank holidays (local 
and national government-decreed peri-
ods of bank closure to attempt to calm 
markets and depositors), and widespread 
bank closure suggested a chaotic and vul-
nerable system in need of reform. The 
Great Depression saw an unusual raft of 
banking regulations and interventions, 
especially in the United States, many of 
which have subsequently been discredited 
as unwarranted and undesirable, includ-
ing restrictions on bank activities (the 
separation of commercial and investment 
banking, subsequently reversed in the 
1980s and 1990s), and government insur-
ance of deposits. Targeted bank recapi-
talizations were also implemented via the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in 
an innovative program that proved quite 
successful at little cost to taxpayers.11 
Academic perspectives on the 
Depression fueled the portrayal of banks 
as crisis-prone. The most important of 
these was the treatment of the 1930s 
banking crises by Milton Friedman 
and Anna J. Schwartz in their book, A 
Monetary History of the United States 
(1963). Friedman and Schwartz argued 
that many solvent banks were forced to 
close as the result of panics, and that fear 
spread from some bank failures to pro-
duce failures elsewhere. Their views that 
banks were inherently unstable, that irra-
tional depositor runs could ruin a bank-
ing system, and that deposit insurance 
was a success, were particularly influential 
coming from economists known for their 
skepticism of government interventions.
Since the publication of A Monetary 
History of the United States, however, other 
scholarship has led to important qualifica-
tions of the Friedman-Schwartz view of 
1930s’ bank distress, and particularly of 
the role of panic in producing distress.12 
Detailed studies of particular regions and 
banks’ experiences do not confirm the 
view that panics were a nationwide phe-
nomenon during 1930 or early 1931, or 
an important contributor to nationwide 
distress until very late in the Depression 
(that is, early 1933). Regional bank dis-
tress often was localized and traceable to 
fundamental shocks to the values of bank 
loans. Indeed, recent scholarship in bank-
ing has emphasized that government pro-
tections of banks, including the U.S. fed-
eral deposit insurance, can undermine 
market discipline of bank risk taking, and 
contribute significantly to the risk of a 
banking crisis. 
Interestingly, the theory behind the 
problem of destabilizing protection has 
been well-known for over a century, and 
was the basis for Franklin Roosevelt’s 
opposition to deposit insurance in 1933 
(an opposition shared by the Fed, the 
Treasury, and Senator Carter Glass). 
Deposit insurance was seen as undesirable 
special-interest legislation designed to 
benefit small banks. Numerous attempts 
to introduce it failed to attract support 
in the Congress.13 Deposit insurance 
removes depositors’ incentives to monitor 
and discipline banks, and frees bankers to 
take imprudent risks (especially when they 
have little or no remaining equity at stake, 
and see an advantage in “resurrection risk 
taking”). The absence of discipline also 
promotes banker incompetence, which 
leads to unwitting risk taking. 
Empirical research on the banking 
collapses of the last two decades of the 
twentieth century has produced a consen-
sus that the greater the protection offered 
by a country’s bank safety net, the greater 
the risk of a banking collapse.14 Studies 
of historical deposit insurance reinforce 
that conclusion. Indeed, the basis for the 
opposition to federal deposit insurance in 
the 1930s was the disastrous experimen-
tation with insurance in several U.S. states 
during the early twentieth century, which 
resulted in banking collapses in all the 
states that adopted insurance.15 
Macroeconomic 
Consequences
As macroeconomists increasingly 
have emphasized, when banks respond 
to losses, deposit outflows, and increased 
risk of loan loss by curtailing the supply 
of credit, that can aggravate the cycli-
cal downturn, magnifying declines in 
investment, production, and asset prices, 
whether or not bank failures occur. Recent 
research explores the linkages among bank 
credit supply, asset prices, and economic 
activity, and focuses in particular on the 
adverse macroeconomic consequences of 
“credit crunches” that result from banks’ 
attempts to limit their risk of failure.16 
This new literature provides evidence 
in support of a “shock-and-propagation” 
approach to understanding the contribu-
tion of financial crises to business cycles. 
This approach has empirical implications 
that can distinguish it from other theo-
ries of the origins, propagation, and con-
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sequences of bank distress. For example, 
this approach helps us to understand why 
it was that during previous severe banking 
panics in the United States, in the face of 
severe asymmetric-information problems 
and associated adverse-selection costs of 
potential bank equity offerings in the 
wake of banking crises, it was prohibitive 
for banks to issue new equity in support 
of continuing lending. Interestingly, fol-
lowing the subprime shock, nearly $500 
billion of new capital was raised prior to 
any announcement of public injections 
of funds. This unusual behavior reflected 
improvements in the structure of the U.S. 
banking system since the 1980s, which 
resulted from nationwide branching and 
the diversification of banking income 
through the deregulation of bank activi-
ties, which mitigated problems of adverse 
selection (in comparison with the 1930s 
or the 1980s). Although it is sometimes 
wrongly believed that deregulation pro-
moted the recent instability of banks, in 
fact subprime lending and securitization 
were in no way linked to deregulation, 
and whatever prudential regulatory fail-
ures attended the subprime boom and 
bust, the last decade has seen substantial 
increases in those regulations, not a relax-
ation of prudential regulation.17 
The shock-and-propagation approach 
to understanding the origins and trans-
mission of banking crises also implies that 
regulatory policy and policy interventions 
that are targeted to respond to the shocks 
buffeting banks (like the bank recapi-
talizations recently employed by the G7 
countries) can be used very effectively to 
offset the harmful macroeconomic con-
sequences of shocks to banks’ balance 
sheets, just as the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation’s preferred stock purchases 
helped to stabilize the banking sector and 
restart the flow of credit after 1933.18 
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The experimental approach in scien-
tific inquiry is commonly traced to Galileo 
Galilei, who pioneered the use of quanti-
tative experiments to test his theories of 
falling bodies.1 Extrapolating his experi-
mental results to the heavenly bodies, he 
pronounced that the services of angels 
were not necessary to keep the planets 
moving, enraging the Church and disciples 
of Aristotle alike. For his efforts, Galileo 
is now viewed as the Father of Modern 
Science. Since the Renaissance, fundamen-
tal advances making use of the experimen-
tal method in the physical and biologi-
cal sciences have been fast and furious.2 
Within economics, the use of controlled 
experiments has steadily increased, fueled 
by the exploration of important economic 
phenomena in the laboratory more than 
one half century ago. 
Although laboratory experiments 
have dominated the experimental land-
scape in economics, the past decade has 
witnessed a significant surge in studies 
that gather data via field experiments. In 
economics, field experiments occupy an 
important middle ground between labo-
ratory experiments and studies that use 
naturally occurring field data.3 This is con-
venient because, on the one hand, eco-
nomic theory is inspired by behavior in the 
field, so we would like to know if results 
from the laboratory domain are transfer-
able to field environments. Alternatively, 
because it is sometimes necessary to invoke 
strict assumptions to achieve identification 
using naturally occurring data, we wonder 
whether similar causal effects can be found 
in studies that have different identification 
assumptions.
Field experiments can play an impor-
tant role in the discovery process by allow-
ing us to tackle questions that are quite 
difficult to answer without use of ran-
domization in a field setting. They also 
can serve an important complementary 
role — similar to the spirit in which astron-
omy draws on the insights from particle 
physics and classical mechanics to make 
sharper insights, field experiments can sup-
plement insights gained from lab and nat-
urally occurring data. To date, field experi-
ments have shed insights on areas as diverse 
as tests of auction theory, tests of the theory 
of private provision of public goods, tests 
that pit neoclassical theory and prospect 
theory, tests that explore issues in cost/ben-
efit analysis and preference elicitation, tests 
that explore competitive market theory 
in the field, tests of alternative incentive 
schemes in developing nations, and tests 
of information assimilation among profes-
sional financial traders.4 
In the remainder of this research sum-
mary, I will summarize field experiments 
within the realm of the economics of char-
ity, with an emphasis on my work, com-
pleted with several colleagues. 
Charitable Fundraising
The charitable marketplace represents 
an interesting set of actors, which might be 
usefully parsed into three distinct types.5 
First, is the Government, which decides 
on tax treatment of contributions and the 
level of grants to charities. This insight-
ful literature includes studies that explore 
crowding out, and studies that measure 
responsiveness of giving to price changes.6 
Second are the donors, who provide the 
resources to produce public goods. The 
final set of actors is the charitable organi-
zations, which develop strategies to attract 
resources to produce public goods. The 
economic interplay of these three actor 
types represents a vibrant area of research. 
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